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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, the appellant, Frank L. Baird 
("Baird"), seeks dismissal on double jeopardy grounds of a 
superseding indictment charging him with violations of federal 
criminal law.  He argues that as a result of a prior 
administrative forfeiture of monies seized from his residence, he 
has already been once "punished" for the offenses alleged in the 
indictment.  A subsequent criminal prosecution would, he argues, 
run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
 To assess the merits of Baird's unusual double jeopardy 
argument, we must determine whether Baird was "punished" as a 
result of the administrative forfeiture of money seized from his 
residence.  We conclude that Baird was not "punished" by the 
administrative forfeiture of seized money never determined to be 
his.  Moreover, assuming, arguendo, that the forfeited money 
belonged to Baird, we further conclude that the administrative 
3 
forfeiture did not place Baird in a former jeopardy.  Therefore, 
the pending prosecution of Baird for the offenses alleged in the 
superseding indictment will not subject Baird to double jeopardy. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the district court's denial of 
Baird's motion to dismiss. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
 In April of 1994, law enforcement officials conducted a 
search of Frank Baird's residence on the suspicion that he was 
manufacturing and selling 3,4 methylenedioxy-methamphetamine 
("Ecstacy").  The search of Baird's residence turned up an 
elaborate clandestine Ecstacy-manufacturing operation, complete 
with precursor chemicals, extensive laboratory apparatus, coded 
formulas for the manufacture of the drug, and stock piles of 
already manufactured Ecstacy.  In addition, $2,582 in United 
States currency was found in the bedroom area of Baird's 
residence.  This money was seized by law enforcement officials. 
 In a superseding indictment returned in August of 1994, 
Baird was charged with various drug and drug-related violations 
of federal criminal law.0  Prior to the returning of this 
                     
0
 Baird was charged in Count 1 with conspiracy to manufacture 
and distribute Ecstacy; in Count 2, with the manufacture of 
approximately 20 kilograms of Ecstacy; in Count 3, with 
possessing approximately 32 kilograms of Ecstacy with the intent 
to distribute it within 1000 feet of the Baldwin School located 
in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania; in Count 4, with possessing 
approximately 32 kilograms of Ecstacy with the intent to 
distribute it; in Count 5, with attempt to manufacture Ecstacy; 
in Count 6, with attempt to manufacture amphetamine; in Count 7, 
with creating a substantial risk of harm to human life while 
manufacturing and attempting to manufacture Ecstacy; in Count 8, 
with maintaining a place for the purpose of manufacturing 
Ecstacy; and in Count 9, with carrying a firearm during and in 
relation to a drug trafficking crime for which Baird could be 
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indictment against him, however, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration ("DEA") carried out the administrative forfeiture 
of the $2,582 seized from Baird's residence. 
 In February of 1995, Baird filed a pre-trial motion to 
dismiss the superseding indictment on double jeopardy grounds. 
The district court denied Baird's motion, finding under United 
States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir. 1994), and United States 
v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994), that initial jeopardy did 
not attach as a result of the administrative forfeiture of the 
seized money.  This interlocutory appeal followed.  We have 
stayed Baird's trial pending resolution of his appeal. 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 Subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is 
based upon 18 U.S.C. § 3231.0  We have jurisdiction over Baird's 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 12910 and the collateral order doctrine 
announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 
541 (1949).  See Witte v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 
2199 (1995) (holding that a multiple punishments double jeopardy 
                                                                  
prosecuted in a Court of the United States, that is, possession 
of Ecstacy with the intent to distribute it, as charged in 
Count 4. 
0
 18 U.S.C. § 3231 provides: 
 
 The district courts of the United States 
shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive 
of the courts of the States, of all offenses 
against the laws of the United States. 
0
 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides: 
 
 The courts of appeals . . . shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final 
decisions of the district courts of the 
United States . . . except where a direct 
review may be had in the Supreme Court. 
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claim is ripe for appellate review even where the claimant has 
yet to have been a second time convicted).0  Our review of the 
double jeopardy issue in this case is plenary.  See Epstein 
Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 
1994) (legal questions are subject to plenary appellate review). 
III.  Double Jeopardy Analysis 
 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment0 has 
been said to protect against three distinct abuses:  a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple 
punishments for the same offense.  See, e.g., North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 
783, 789 (1994).  "These protections stem from the underlying 
premise that a defendant should not be twice tried or punished 
for the same offense."  Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 789.  According to 
the parties, it is the third of these abuses -- multiple 
punishments for the same offense -- which is of concern in this 
appeal. 
 The Supreme Court has stated that "the primary evil to 
be guarded against [by the Double Jeopardy Clause] is successive 
                     
0
 The government has filed a motion to dismiss Baird's appeal 
in which it argues that the right Baird asserts -- the right not 
to be punished twice for the same offense -- can be fully 
vindicated on appeal at the conclusion of Baird's trial, and that 
we therefore lack jurisdiction under the collateral order 
doctrine to hear Baird's appeal.  In light of the recently 
decided Witte v. United States, this argument is clearly 
untenable.  We will, therefore, deny the government's motion to 
dismiss. 
0
 The Double Jeopardy Clause provides:  "[N]or shall any 
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."  U.S. Const. Amdt. 5. 
6 
prosecutions:  `[T]he prohibition against multiple trials is the 
controlling constitutional principle.'"  Id. (citations omitted). 
Nevertheless, the prohibition against multiple punishments for 
the same offense has "deep roots in our history and our 
jurisprudence."  United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 
(1989). 
As early as 1641, the Colony of Massachusetts 
in its "Body of Liberties" stated:  "No man 
shall be twise sentenced by Civill Justice 
for one and the same Crime, offence, or 
Trespasse."  In drafting his initial version 
of what came to be our Double Jeopardy 
Clause, James Madison focused explicitly on 
the issue of multiple punishment:  "No person 
shall be subject, except in cases of 
impeachment, to more than one punishment or 
one trial for the same offence."  In our case 
law too, this Court, over a century ago, 
observed:  "If there is anything settled in 
the jurisprudence of England and America, it 
is that no man can be twice lawfully punished 
for the same offence."  Ex parte Lange, 18 
Wall 163, 168, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874). 
Id. (some citations omitted). 
 In two recent unanimous decisions, the Supreme Court 
gave the "no multiple punishments" rule a "breadth of effect it 
had never before enjoyed."  See Montana Dept. of Rev. v. Kurth 
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1957 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In 
the first of these, United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), 
the Court for the first time announced that civil penalties may, 
in certain instances, constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy 
purposes.  Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.  In the second, Austin v. 
United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), the Court relied upon 
Halper to conclude that civil forfeitures undertaken pursuant to 
7 
21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)0 constitute "punishment" for 
purposes of Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause0 analysis. 
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.  While Austin addressed the meaning 
of "punishment" in a different context, we agree with the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:  the "only fair reading of the 
Court's decision in Austin is that it resolves the `punishment' 
issue with respect to forfeiture cases for purposes of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause as well as the Excessive Fines Clause."  United 
States v. $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219 
(9th Cir. 1994), opinion amended on denial of rehearing, ___ F.3d 
____, 1995 WL 321826 (9th Cir. 1995); see also David Smith 
Prosecution and Defense of Forfeiture Cases ¶ 12.10[2], at 12-131 
                     
0
 These statutes provide for the forfeiture of: 
 
 (4)  All conveyances, including 
aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are 
used, or are intended for use, to transport, 
or in any manner to facilitate the 
transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or 
concealment of [controlled substances, their 
raw materials, and equipment used in their 
manufacture and distribution] 
 
. . . . 
 
 (7)  All real property, including any 
right, title, and interest (including any 
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot 
or tract of land and any appurtenances or 
improvements, which is used, or intended to 
be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or 
to facilitate the commission of, a violation 
of this subchapter punishable by more than 
one year's imprisonment . . . . 
 
21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4), (7). 
0
 The Eighth Amendment provides:  "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted."  U.S. Const. Amdt. 8. 
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("The Supreme Court's decision in Austin v. United States, makes 
it clear that Halper's double jeopardy protections do apply to 
the vast majority of civil forfeiture cases."). 
 According to Baird, together, Halper and Austin 
establish that the administrative forfeiture of money under 21 
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)0 constitutes "punishment" for purposes of 
double jeopardy analysis.  We do not think Halper and Austin go 
so far.  While these precedents do suggest that the civil 
forfeiture of money under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) is "punishment" 
precluding the meting out of additional punishment for the "same 
offence" by the "same sovereign" in a subsequent proceeding, see 
$405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1222 (holding that 
civil forfeitures of drug proceeds under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) 
constitute "punishment" under Halper and Austin); but see Tilley, 
18 F.3d at 300 (holding that civil forfeitures of drug proceeds 
do not constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes), 
Halper and Austin do not suggest, let alone establish, that 
administrative forfeiture under 881(a)(6) amounts to "punishment" 
relevant to the double jeopardy inquiry.  To understand the 
critical distinction we are drawing between civil and 
                     
0
 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) provides for the forfeiture of: 
 
 All moneys, negotiable instruments, 
securities, or other things of value 
furnished or intended to be furnished by any 
person in exchange for a controlled substance 
in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds 
traceable to such an exchange, and all 
moneys, negotiable instruments, and 
securities used or intended to be used to 
facilitate any violation of this subchapter 
. . . . 
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administrative forfeiture, a brief discussion of the nature and 
process of administrative forfeiture is in order. 
 The purpose of administrative forfeiture is "to save 
the government the time and expense of [a] judicial [forfeiture] 
proceeding in cases where the value of the seized property [is] 
small."  United States v. United States Currency Etc., 754 F.2d 
208, 211 (7th Cir. 1985).0  In keeping with this purpose, Federal 
civil forfeiture statutes allow certain statutorily defined 
categories of property to be forfeited administratively, i.e., 
without the filing of a civil forfeiture action in federal 
district court.  See David Smith Prosecution and Defense of 
Forfeiture Cases ¶ 6.01, at 6-1. 
 The administrative forfeiture procedure begins with the 
seizing agency, in this case the DEA, publishing a notice of 
seizure and intent to forfeit once a week for at least three 
successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
judicial district in which the seizure occurred.  19 U.S.C. 
§ 1607(a); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75.  The agency is also statutorily 
required to give personal written notice of the seizure and 
information on the applicable procedure to any party who appears 
to have an interest in the seized property.  19 U.S.C. § 1607(a). 
A person may contest an administrative forfeiture, at any time 
within twenty days of the first publication of the notice of 
seizure, by filing a claim "stating his [or her] interest 
                     
0
 Under 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a), administrative forfeiture may be 
undertaken to effect the forfeiture of as much as $500,000 in 
United States currency. 
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therein," and posting a cost bond of $5,000 or ten percent of the 
value of the property, whichever is less, but not less than $250. 
19 U.S.C. § 1608.  The proper and timely filing of a claim and 
cost bond has the effect of stopping the administrative 
forfeiture process, and forcing the seizing agency to refer the 
matter to the United States Attorney for the district where the 
property was seized for the institution of judicial forfeiture 
proceedings in the ordinary mode prescribed by law.  19 U.S.C. 
§§ 1603(b) and 1608; 21 C.F.R. § 1316.76(b).  Where no person 
files a claim to the seized property within the statutory period, 
the agency is authorized to declare the property forfeited.  19 
U.S.C. § 1609(b); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.77. 
 In sum, administrative forfeiture is a procedure 
available to the government "only if the value of the property 
seized is less than the jurisdictional amount and if no claim to 
the property is filed within the twenty days after the date of 
first publication of the notice of seizure."  United States 
Currency Etc., 754 F.2d at 212 (emphasis in the original). 
Significantly for our purposes, administrative forfeiture is only 
appropriate in cases where the seized property in question goes 
unclaimed.  Without overstating it, administrative forfeiture is, 
in reality, a non-proceeding -- it is merely the consequence of 
no one having come forward to claim the property seized or 
contest its forfeitability.  With this introduction to 
administrative forfeiture in mind, we turn now to determine the 
merits of Baird's double jeopardy claim. 
11 
 Without adopting a position on the matter, we can 
certainly understand how a court might conclude that civil 
forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) of drug proceeds 
constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.  See 
$405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1218-22.  However, 
we cannot fathom how an administrative forfeiture, under section 
881(a)(6), of unclaimed alleged drug proceeds could possibly be 
held to constitute "punishment" in relation to an individual's 
double jeopardy claim.  Any "punishment" resulting from the 
administrative forfeiture of suspected drug proceeds is 
punishment only in the abstract, wholly unattached to any 
specific person, and thus cannot serve as the basis for a double 
jeopardy claim.  This is because administrative forfeiture does 
not, and, by its very definition, cannot, entail a determination 
of ownership of the property to be forfeited.  All property 
administratively forfeited is, as a matter of law, "ownerless" 
property, and the taking of ownerless property "punishes" no one. 
Because Baird never asserted an interest in the money that was 
seized from his residence, he cannot now claim to have been 
punished by its forfeiture. 
 Even were we to assume, arguendo, that Baird was the 
owner of the seized and forfeited money, we would nonetheless 
affirm the district court's denial of Baird's motion to dismiss 
because we do not agree that administrative forfeitures place in 
jeopardy the person whose property is so forfeited. 
 Succinctly stated, "[y]ou can't have double jeopardy 
without a former jeopardy[;]" that is, to prevail on a double 
12 
jeopardy claim, former jeopardy must be shown to have attached. 
United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 
Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 389 (1975).  In essence, 
Baird asks us to find that he was placed in jeopardy by the non-
judicial administrative forfeiture process undertaken in this 
case.  In rejecting this argument, we are compelled to explain 
what it means to be placed "in jeopardy." 
 The Double Jeopardy Clause was "designed to protect an 
individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and 
possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense." Green 
v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
The underlying idea, one that is deeply 
ingrained in at least the Anglo-American 
system of jurisprudence, is that the State 
with all its resources and power should not 
be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged offense, 
thereby subjecting him [or her] to 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and 
compelling him [or her] to live in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, 
as well as enhancing the possibility that 
even though innocent he [or she] may be found 
guilty. 
 
Id. at 187-88.  As an aid to the resolution of double jeopardy 
claims, "courts have found it useful to define a point in 
criminal [and, post-Halper, civil] proceedings at which the 
constitutional purposes and policies [behind the Double Jeopardy 
Clause] are implicated by resort to the concept of `attachment of 
jeopardy.'"  Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388.  In the case of a jury 
trial, for example, jeopardy is understood as attaching when the 
jury is empaneled and sworn.  Id.  In the case of a non-jury 
13 
trial, jeopardy has been said to attach when the court begins to 
hear evidence.  Id.  In any event, the Court has "consistently 
adhered to the view that jeopardy does not attach, and the 
constitutional [double jeopardy] prohibition can have no 
application, until a defendant is `put to trial before the trier 
of facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.'"  Serfass, 420 
U.S. at 388 (emphasis supplied). 
Both the history of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause and its terms demonstrate that it does 
not come into play until a proceeding begins 
before a trier "having jurisdiction to try 
the question of the guilt or innocence of the 
accused."  Without risk of a determination of 
guilt, jeopardy does not attach, and neither 
an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes 
double jeopardy. 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  It should be clear from this 
description of the "attachment" concept that jeopardy does not, 
and cannot, attach until one is made a party to a proceeding 
before a trier of fact having jurisdiction to try the question of 
guilt or innocence, and that, until such time, the constitutional 
double jeopardy prohibition can have no application.0 
                     
0In Halper and Austin, and, for that matter, in Montana Dept. of 
Rev. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994), the Court did not 
discuss the attachment threshold issue.  We do not take the 
Court's failure to discuss "attachment" in these cases to signify 
that it has intended, by implication, to do away with the 
venerable "attachment" threshold requirement.  In each of these 
three cases, it was clear that the double jeopardy claimant or 
claimants suffered "punishment" only after having first been made 
a party to a proceeding before a trier of fact with jurisdiction 
to decide "innocence" or "guilt."  Thus, the "attachment" 
threshold was, in each of these cases, clearly enough satisfied 
that no discussion of it was required. 
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 Because Baird failed to contest the forfeiture, he 
never became a party to any judicial proceeding, criminal or 
civil.  In fact, no judicial proceeding occurred prior to the 
forfeiture of the money -- such being the very nature of 
administrative forfeiture.  Baird has therefore yet to have been 
placed in jeopardy, or at risk, of a determination of "guilt" and 
the concomitant imposition of "punishment."  Like the double 
jeopardy claimant in Torres, as a non-party to the administrative 
forfeiture process, Baird was not, and could not have been, 
placed at risk by that process.  And without having been placed 
at risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy did not attach as a 
consequence of the administrative forfeiture.  Thus, "neither an 
appeal nor further prosecution [of Baird would] constitute[] 
double jeopardy."  Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465 (quoting Serfass, 420 
U.S. at 389). 
 By asking us to find a double jeopardy violation in his 
case, Baird is asking, essentially, that we give to the "no 
multiple punishments" rule a breadth of effect greater even than 
that given to it by Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch.  Baird would 
have us conclude that multiple punishments, per se, violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  Even under the above precedents, this 
just isn't so.  Prior to Halper, the "no multiple punishments" 
rule was of rather limited effect -- merely proscribing the 
imposition of those cumulative punishments, for example, fine and 
incarceration, not authorized by the legislature.  See Halper, 
490 U.S. at 451 n.10.  As noted above, Halper extended the no-
double-punishments rule to civil penalties.  Halper also 
15 
"affirm[ed] that [the no multiple punishments rule] demand[s] 
more than mere fidelity to legislative intent . . . ."  Kurth 
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1957 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Significantly, however, Halper did not remove from the double 
jeopardy claimant's shoulders the burden of establishing a former 
jeopardy.  A post-Halper double jeopardy claimant in the position 
of Baird, therefore, cannot prevail merely upon a showing that he 
or she has been once punished for the same offense by the same 
sovereign.  Rather, the post-Halper double jeopardy claimant must 
also show that the initial punishment was meted out during the 
course of a prior proceeding having the "functional equivalen[ce] 
of a [prior] criminal prosecution that placed the [claimant] in 
jeopardy . . . `for the same offence.'"  Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 
at 1948.  In other words, to prevail on his post-Halper double 
jeopardy claim, Baird would have to establish a former jeopardy.0  
Because of the very manner in which the seized property was 
forfeited, this he was unable to do. 
                     
0The dissent argues that participation in a forfeiture proceeding 
should not be a precondition to a double jeopardy claim.  This 
argument does away with the multiple jeopardy requirement and is, 
therefore, contrary to Supreme Court precedent, see Serfass, 420 
U.S. 377 (1975), not to mention the language of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause itself.  We are also troubled by the suggestion, 
implicit in the dissent, that one can be "punished" in a manner 
relevant to the Double Jeopardy Clause without having been 
subjected to any judicial process whatsoever. "Unless the whole 
doctrine of our system of jurisprudence, both the Constitution 
and the common law, for the protection of personal rights . . . 
[is] a nullity," Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 176 (1874), no one 
may be "punished" in a manner relevant to the Double Jeopardy 
Clause without first having been subjected to some form of 
judicial procedure, either in the form of a criminal prosecution 
or the "functional equivalent" thereof. 
16 
IV.  Conclusion 
 Having concluded that we have jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal, and having further concluded that Frank Baird was not 
punished as a result of the administrative forfeiture of the 
money seized from his residence, and that a former jeopardy did 
not attach as a result of the administrative forfeiture of money 
assumed for the sake of argument to have been Baird's property, 
we will deny the government's motion to dismiss this appeal, and 
affirm the district court's denial of Baird's motion to dismiss 
the superseding indictment on double jeopardy grounds. 
_________________________ 
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United States v. Frank L. Baird, No. 95-1202. 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
I agree with the majority that this court has jurisdiction over defendant's appeal.  Maj. 
op. at    [Typescript at 4-5]. Accordingly, I too would deny the United States's motion to 
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  On the merits, I conclude that forfeiture 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(6) may constitute punishment for purposes of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. I respectfully dissent because I believe that double jeopardy can arise 
following a forfeiture, even where defendant has not participated in the forfeiture 
proceeding, if the defendant can establish that he was the owner of the forfeited property 
and that such forfeiture constituted punishment. 
 
I. 
   
The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause reads: "nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."  U.S. Const., Amdt. 5.  The 
Supreme Court has explained that "the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three 
distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same 
offense."  United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989). The instant case involves 
the third of these protections, a protection which "has deep roots in our history and 
jurisprudence."  Id.   
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In Witte v. United States,     U.S.    , 115 S.Ct. 2199 (1995), the Supreme Court recently 
held that although a petitioner had not yet been twice convicted, his "multiple 
punishment" claim was ripe for appellate review before trial because "the Double Jeopardy 
Clause protects against more than the actual imposition of two punishments for the same 
offense; by its terms, it protects a criminal defendant from being twice put in jeopardy 
for such punishment."  Id. at 2204-2205.  In the instant case, if defendant was punished 
by the forfeiture, the prospect of a criminal trial and further punishment places him in 
jeopardy of prohibited multiple punishments.  Thus, it is appropriate and required to 
adjudicate his claim prior to trial and on appeal, before he is subjected to the risk
second punishment for the same offense.   
II. 
 
I turn to the merits of defendant's double jeopardy claim.  The question presented is 
whether forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C.A. §881(a)(6) (West 1981) constitutes punishment 
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Three recent Supreme Court decisions guide 
our analysis.  See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,    U.S.    , 114 S.Ct. 1937 
(1994); Austin v. United States,    U.S.    , 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993); United States v. 
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). 
In United States v. Halper, the Supreme Court considered "whether and under what 
circumstances a civil penalty may constitute 'punishment' for the purposes of double 
jeopardy analysis."  490 U.S. at 436.  The Court fashioned the following test: "a civil 
sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can 
only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is 
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punishment."  Id. at 448. Specifically, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause's 
prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense was violated where a 
defendant who already had been punished in a criminal prosecution was subjected to an 
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction served the traditional 
goals of punishment--deterrence and retribution.  Id. at 449. 
The Supreme Court recently applied the Halper test in Department of Revenue v. Kurth 
Ranch, supra.  There, the Supreme Court considered whether a state tax imposed on the 
possession and storage of dangerous drugs constituted a second punishment for purposes of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The Court began its discussion by noting that although the 
Amendment's text only mentions harms to "life or limb," it is well settled that the 
Amendment covers monetary penalties.  114 S.Ct. at 1941 n.1. Recognizing that Halper
decided that the legislature's description of a statute as civil is not determinative of 
the Double Jeopardy issue, the Court focused instead on whether the tax had punitive 
characteristics that subjected it to the constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  
Ranch, 114 S.Ct. at 1945.  The Court found it indicative of penal intent that the tax was 
conditioned on the commission of a crime and was exacted only after the taxpayer had been 
arrested for the precise conduct that gave rise to the tax obligation.  Id. at 1947.  The 
Court held that the drug tax was punitive in nature and therefore must be imposed in the 
first proceeding or not at all.  Id. at 1948. 
In Austin v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the rationale of 
Halper to determine whether civil forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 881(a)(4) and (7) 
(West Supp. 1995) constitutes punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive 
Fines Clause.  Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2806.  However, rather than focusing, as the Court had 
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done in Halper, on the goals of the sanction in the individual case, the Austin Court 
reasoned that in the forfeiture context it made more sense to focus on the forfeiture 
statute as a whole because "[t]he value of the conveyances and real property forfeitable 
under §§881(a)(4) and (a)(7), . . . vary so dramatically that any relationship between the 
Government's actual costs and the amount of the sanction is merely coincidental."  
113 S.Ct. at 2812 n.14.  See also Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. at 1948 (focusing on goals of tax 
statute as a whole).  The Court concluded that forfeitures under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) 
are properly considered punishment because: nothing in the sections contradicts the 
historical understanding of forfeiture as imposing punishment; the sections focus on the 
owner's culpability by providing for the "innocent owner" defense and by tying forfeiture 
directly to the commission of drug offenses; and Congress understood the sections as 
serving the goals of deterrence and punishment. Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2810-11.   
Thus, we know from Halper and Kurth Ranch that a civil sanction can constitute punishment 
for double jeopardy purposes and that the proper focus is whether a civil sanction is 
punitive in nature. Moreover, we know from Austin that civil forfeiture pursuant to 21 
U.S.C.A. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)((7) is punishment for purposes of the Excessive Fines 
Clause.   
The Supreme Court's holding in Austin that forfeiture pursuant to §881(a)(4) and (a)(7)
constitutes punishment is controlling for purposes of § 881(a)(6) (dealing with monies, 
negotiable instruments, and securities), the section at issue in this case.0  The Austin
                     
0The following items are subject to forfeiture under §881(a)(6): 
 
All monies, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value 
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled 
substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an 
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Court's historical analysis of forfeiture as punishment and its reliance on the 
legislative history of § 881 are equally applicable in the instant case.  Moreover, like 
the sections of the forfeiture statute at issue in Austin, §881(a)(6) also includes an 
innocent owner defense, which focuses on the culpability of the owner in a way that makes 
it look more like punishment.  See Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2810-11.  Section 881(a)(6)'s 
conditioning of forfeiture on a violation of the Controlled Substances Act is also 
indicative of Congress' punitive intent.  See id. at 2811. 
Further, the legislative history of § 881(a)(6) evidences Congress's intent to punish and 
to deter.  Senator Culver, a sponsor of the legislation, said it would "provide the United 
States with strong new weapons to . . . strike at the profits of illegal drug 
trafficking."  124 Cong. Rec. S17644 (Oct. 7, 1978).  Senator Nunn, also a sponsor of the 
legislation, explained that "[t]he criminal justice system can only be effective if there 
is a meaningful deterrent.  It is important that the offender be aware of the risk he is
running."  124 Cong. Rec. S11965 (July 27, 1978).  "We cannot forget that profit, 
astronomical profit, is the base motivation of drug traffickers."  Id.  By "striking out 
against the profits from illicit drug trafficking" the enactment of § 661(a)(6) woul
enhance "the punitive and deterrent purposes of the Controlled Substances Act," which 
would then "have greater impact on drug trafficking."  Id.   
                                                                                          
exchange, and all monies, negotiable instruments, and securities used or 
intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that 
no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the 
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner 
to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that 
owner. 
 
21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(6) (West 1981). 
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The specific holding in Austin is that civil forfeiture constitutes punishment for 
purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause.  In contrast, this case involves a claim under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, yet I believe that Austin is controlling for double jeopardy 
claims as well.  Significantly, in Austin the Supreme Court relied on Halper, which 
involved the Double Jeopardy Clause, to decide whether a civil sanction constituted 
punishment for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause.  See 1 David B. Smith, Prosecution 
and Defense of Forfeiture Cases, ¶ 12.10[2], at 12-136 (1994) ("The Supreme Court's 
decision in Austin v. United States, makes it clear that Halper's double jeopardy 
protections do apply to the vast majority of civil forfeiture cases.").      
Recently, the Ninth Circuit similarly relied on Austin and Halper in holding that civil 
forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(6) constitutes punishment which triggers the 
protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  United States v. $405,089.23 United States 
Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), opinion amended on denial of rehearing, 56 F.3d 41 
(9th Cir. 1995).  Cf. United States v. Ursery,     F.3d    , No. 94-1127, 1995 WL 411189 
(6th Cir. July 13, 1995) (holding that civil forfeiture pursuant to §881(a)(7) followed by 
criminal conviction for the same offense constituted double jeopardy).  The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that: 
the only fair reading of the Court's decision in Austin is that it resolves the 
'punishment' issue with respect to forfeiture cases for purposes of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause as well as the Excessive Fines Clause.  In short, if a 
forfeiture constitutes punishment under the Halper criteria, it constitutes 
'punishment' for purposes of both clauses. 
33 F.3d at 1219.  Thus, the court held that the government violated the Double Jeopardy 
Clause by obtaining criminal convictions against the defendant and then continuing to 
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pursue the forfeiture action.  The court concluded by discussing the practical effect of 
Austin on the government's prosecution of cases: 
Because in the case of statutes like those before us a criminal prosecution and 
a forfeiture action based on the same offense must now be brought in the same 
proceeding--that is, the same indictment--the government will often be forced to 
choose whether to include a criminal forfeiture count in the indictment (and 
thus forego the favorable burdens it would face in the civil forfeiture 
proceeding) or to pursue only the civil forfeiture action (and thus forego the 
opportunity to prosecute the claimants criminally). If, in such cases, the 
government wishes both to obtain forfeiture and to impose other forms of 
criminal punishment, it 'will have to rely to a much greater extent on criminal 
forfeiture.'  It is entirely reasonable to put the government to this choice.  
After Austin, the law requires it. 
33 F.3d at 1222 (citation omitted).  I find the Ninth Circuit's reasoning persuasive.
The government counters that under Austin only civil forfeitures that are found to be 
excessive are to be considered punishment. However, the government misstates the holding 
in Austin.  Austin holds that all forfeitures under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are meant in 
part to punish and therefore can run afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause.  Austin, 113 
S.Ct. at 2812.  The Austin court left the issue of whether the forfeiture was 
constitutionally excessive to the district court in the first instance.  Id.  
The government also contends that application of Halper's "rational-relation" test--
whether the amount of the sanction appears to be rationally related to the damages caused 
by the wrongful conduct of the defendant--results in the conclusion that the instant 
forfeiture of defendant's property does not constitute punishment.  However, in Austin
the Supreme Court found that the "rational-relation" test was inapplicable in the 
forfeiture setting, and, instead, looked to the purpose behind the forfeiture statute 
itself, concluding that forfeiture serves in part to punish.  113 S.Ct. at 2812 n.14.  I 
agree that in the forfeiture context it does not make sense to compare the amount seized 
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with the government's damages and actual costs; the value of the property seized is purely 
fortuitous, and thus "any relationship between the Government's actual costs and the 
amount of the sanction is merely coincidental."  Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2811-12, 2812 n.14.  
Moreover, the government has failed to demonstrate on the record how the forfeited 
property relates to its cost of investigation and prosecution of defendant's case. 
Finally, the government argues that to the extent that the forfeiture in the instant case 
can be considered punishment, it is punishment imposed against the property itself and not 
against the owner of the property.  However, the Supreme Court in Austin stressed that it 
has consistently recognized that in rem forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the 
owner.  113 S.Ct. at 2810. Moreover, the Court made clear that forfeiture of property such 
as cars and real estate under the current forfeiture statute is dependent not on the 
criminal nature of the property, but on the illegal use their owners make of them.  
Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2810-11.  The same reasoning applies to monies forfeited under 
§881(a)(6).  Therefore, it is the owners who are punished by the forfeiture of such 
property.  Id. at 2811.   
The Supreme Court in Halper addressed the question of what constitutes punishment for 
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  490 U.S. at 436.  The Halper Court announced that 
the proper inquiry is whether the sanction serves the goals of punishment, i.e. 
retribution or deterrence.  Id. at 448.  In Austin, the Court held that Congress intended 
for the forfeiture of property pursuant to §§  881(a)(4) and (a)(7) to deter and to 
punish.  See Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2811.  Similarly, for reasons previously discussed, § 
881(a)(6) was intended to deter and to punish. Therefore, I conclude that forfeiture 
pursuant to § 881(a)(6) constitutes punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
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III. 
 
Having decided that forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(6) constitutes punishment 
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, I turn to the question of whether the sequence 
of the proceedings makes a constitutional difference.  In all of the Supreme Court cases 
previously discussed, the criminal sanction preceded the civil sanction and thus it is the 
second, civil sanction that has been barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. By contrast, 
in the instant case defendant asks us to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar his 
criminal prosecution.   
The Court noted in Kurth Ranch that the statute at issue did not raise the question of
whether a civil proceeding which is designed to inflict punishment may bar a subsequent 
criminal proceeding.  114 S.Ct. at 1947 n.21.  In his dissent, Justice SCALIA warned that, 
although the majority confronted the relatively easy task of disallowing a civil penalty 
after a criminal sanction already had been imposed, cases in which criminal penalties are 
at stake will demand much more of courts.  Id. at 1958-59 (SCALIA, J. dissenting).  
Justice SCALIA opined that the order of punishment cannot possibly make a constitutional 
difference.  Id. at 1958. I agree.   
There is no reason why the sequence of the proceedings should make a difference in this 
constitutional analysis.  In other words, the holdings in Halper and Austin apply equally 
to cases in which the civil sanction precedes the criminal sanction. "[T]he labels 
'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance."  Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.  
Instead, the critical inquiry remains whether the proceeding constitutes punishment for 
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double jeopardy purposes and whether the defendant is receiving or is at risk of receiving 
multiple punishments for the same offense.  Several other circuits also have held that the 
order of the proceedings, civil or criminal, does not affect the double jeopardy 
determination.  See United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 843 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
U.S.    , 113 S.Ct. 123 (1992); United States v. Mayers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990); cf. United States v. Ursery,     F.3d    , No. 94
1995 WL 411189 (6th Cir. July 13, 1995) (finding double jeopardy where civil forfeiture 
preceded criminal prosecution).    
 
IV. 
 
I next consider whether it makes a difference in the double jeopardy analysis that 
defendant in the instant case did not participate in the forfeiture proceedings.  The 
district court's ruling is based on the stated rationale that "jeopardy ha[d] not attached 
pursuant to the administrative forfeiture proceeding," presumably because defendant did 
not contest the forfeiture.  United States v. Baird, No. 94-0215, Order, at n.1 (E.D. Pa. 
March 14, 1995). Similarly, the majority concludes that administrative forfeiture can 
never constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause because: (1) the 
property is ownerless, i.e. no one has made a claim and/or filed a cost bond, and the 
taking of ownerless property punishes no one; and (2) administrative forfeiture does not 
place in jeopardy the person whose property is so forfeited, because it does not involve a 
judicial proceeding.   
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I believe that, if a defendant can prove that he was the owner of the property seized, 
participation in the forfeiture proceedings is not and should not be a precondition to a 
claim of double jeopardy.  A defendant may choose not to participate because the 
allegations are true, or for fear that a claim of ownership could be utilized against him 
in the criminal proceeding.  For instance, the government alleged in this case that 
defendant owned the seized property and that the property was used or acquired as a result 
of a drug-related offense.  If the allegations are true, what purpose would be served by 
defendant's participation in the forfeiture proceeding?   
Moreover, a claim of ownership in the forfeiture proceeding conceivably could be used 
against defendant in the criminal proceeding. Thus, requiring defendant to participate in 
the forfeiture proceeding as a precondition to a double jeopardy claim would force 
defendant to choose between waiving his privilege against self-incrimination or waiving 
his right to assert a double jeopardy violation.  The Supreme Court stressed in Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), that one constitutional right need not be surrendered 
in order to assert another.  Id. at 394. In Simmons, the Court found that an 
unconstitutional dilemma was created when defendant was required to surrender his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in order to establish his standing to 
assert an arguably valid Fourth Amendment claim.  Id.  The Court resolved the dilemma by 
holding that: "when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on 
Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at 
trial."  Id. Similarly, in the instant case, we refuse to subject defendant to such an 
unconstitutional dilemma by requiring him to intervene in the forfeiture proceeding in 
order to preserve his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause.   The issue should be 
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whether defendant was the owner, not whether he filed a proper and timely claim of 
ownership in the forfeiture proceeding.  He is punished if his property is forfeited, 
irrespective of whether or not he participated.  Hence, there should be no distinction 
between administrative and civil forfeiture; in either instance, a defendant must 
establish ownership and punishment before he can claim double jeopardy.  See also Smith, 
supra, ¶ 12.10, at 12-141 n.33.1 ("[A] rule which would require property owners to file a 
claim and go through the motions of contesting a civil forfeiture merely to preserve a 
double jeopardy issue has little to recommend it.  Tens of thousands of uncontested 
forfeitures would soon find their way into court.").  
The majority relies on Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975), in holding that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause requires that defendant participate in two judicial proceedings.  
Maj. op. at   [Typescript at 16 n.11].  However, Serfass, in contrast to the instant ca
did not involve a "multiple punishments" claim and does not stand for the proposition that 
multiple judicial proceedings are a precondition to all double jeopardy claims.  In this 
case, defendant claims that he was punished by the forfeiture of his monies and that trial 
on the instant indictment would subject him to multiple punishments for the same offense. 
The issue is thus whether defendant is at risk of being twice punished for the same 
offense, not whether defendant is at risk of being twice tried.  
  Lastly, in United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit 
held that the administrative forfeiture of monies did not bar defendant's sentence of 
imprisonment.  I am unpersuaded by the Torres decision to the extent that it holds that, 
unless a defendant participates in the forfeiture proceeding, he cannot claim double 
jeopardy.  Additionally, this case is factually distinguishable from Torres.  Defendants 
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Torres and Olivares were arrested and their cash seized when they attempted to buy drugs 
from "sellers" who turned out to be federal agents.  Torres, 28 F.3d at 1464.  The monies 
were administratively forfeited, and subsequently defendant Torres was convicted in a 
separate criminal proceeding.  Id.  On appeal, Torres argued that his criminal sentence 
was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Id.  In rejecting Torres's double jeopardy 
claim, the court stressed that it was not clear who owned the forfeited funds and 
speculated that "perhaps he [Torres] was just a courier, making the buy on behalf of an 
undisclosed principal." Id. at 1466.  In contrast, the ownership of the funds in the 
instant case is not honestly contested. 
 
V. 
 
Assuming that defendant can establish that he was the owner of the forfeited property, the 
nature of the property forfeited should affect one's ability to claim double jeopardy.  
For illustrative purposes, I will divide property subject to forfeiture under §881(a) into 
two categories.0    
The first category includes property which is dangerous and/or illegal per se and thus 
subject to destruction or removal from society. The forfeiture of such property cannot 
constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause because its forfeiture 
may be characterized as "remedial."  This category includes: 
                     
0Moreover, we need not even consider whether confiscating property that a defendant does 
not have title to, i.e. stolen property, is punishment for double jeopardy purposes.  We 
recognize that the government can immediately confiscate such property and is not required 
to institute forfeiture proceedings. 
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all controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or 
acquired, § (a)(1); 
 
 all raw materials, products, and equipment which are used in manufacturing any controlled 
substance, § (a)(2); 
 
all property which is used as a container, § (a)(3); 
 
all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data 
which are used in violation of this subchapter, § (a)(5); 
 
all controlled substances which have been possessed in violation of this 
subchapter, § (a)(8); 
 
all listed chemicals, all drug manufacturing equipment, all tableting machines, 
all encapsulating machines, and all gelatin capsules, § (a)(9); 
 
any drug paraphernalia, § (a)(10); 
 
any firearm, § (a)(11). 
21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1995).     
The items included in the first category are either illegal per se and/or dangerous to 
society in general or to law enforcement agents in particular.  The Austin Court conceded 
that "the forfeiture of contraband itself may be characterized as remedial because it 
removes dangerous or illegal items from society."  113 S.Ct. at 2811 (citing United States 
v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984), which involved forfeiture of 
firearms).  Indeed, Congress recognized that such property is dangerous by providing for 
its summary forfeiture and destruction.  Specifically, section 881(f)(1) (West Supp. 1995) 
provides that all controlled substances, all raw materials, and any equipment or container 
subject to forfeiture, which cannot be separated safely from such raw material or product, 
shall be deemed contraband and summarily forfeited to the United States. Section 881(f)(2) 
(West Supp. 1995) allows the government to destroy such property.  See also H.R. Rep. No. 
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101-681(I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6506 
(providing for summary forfeiture and destruction of dangerous substances and the 
equipment or containers from which these substances cannot be safely separated "because of 
the dangers they create for law enforcement agents").  Similarly, Congress provided that 
the selling and interstate transport of drug paraphernalia is illegal, § 863(a) (West 
Supp. 1995), and that drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure, forfeiture, and 
destruction, § 863(c) (West Supp. 1995). 
The second category consists of property forfeited pursuant to  §§881(a)(4), (6), (7), 
such as boats, planes, cars, real property, and monies, which courts have distinguished as 
"derivative contraband."  Derivative contraband has been defined as articles which are not 
inherently illegal, but are used in an unlawful manner.  See United States v. Farrell
F.2d 1341, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (monies used in drug transaction are derivative 
contraband).  The forfeiture of such property may serve as a basis for a double jeopardy 
claim because, as previously discussed, the forfeiture of property pursuant to §§ 
881(a)(4), (6), and (7) is punitive in nature. 
 
VI. 
   
Finally, I pose the question whether the source of the property seized should affect the 
determination of double jeopardy.  Two scenarios illustrate my concerns:  In the first 
scenario, a person acquires a house or car by honest means.  If that property is forfeited 
because it is utilized in connection with criminal activity, the owner is clearly 
punished.  Under such circumstances, a prior or subsequent criminal proceeding based on 
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the same charges, which justified the forfeiture, would implicate double jeopardy.  My 
concern is with the second scenario, in which a defendant acquires property by dishonest 
means.  For instance, monies passed to a person in a drug sale are immediately seized and 
ultimately forfeited.  I have difficulty in concluding that such forfeiture, i.e. the 
seizure of monies derived from an illegal transaction, bars criminal prosecution for that 
drug sale.  I acknowledge that the monies seized technically are the property of the drug 
dealer, and, thus, their forfeiture constitutes punishment in the ordinary sense of the 
word; but I ponder whether it does or should constitute punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes.  The issue is further complicated if the forfeiture involves property acquired 
from the expenditure of monies illegally obtained--the indirect rather than the direct 
acquisitions of illegal activity. 
Since the majority does not find double jeopardy because of the nature of the forfeiture 
proceeding, this distinction is not addressed. However, I find it worthy of serious 
consideration.  Moreover, I recognize that if my distinction were to be adopted, a 
secondary issue would have to be resolved concerning the applicable burden of proof and 
where to place it. 
 
VII. 
  
I would vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
